Europe
Most of what we consider to be “modern warfare” descends from Europeans and their inheritors. Historically, the small continent has been home to numerous distinct states, religions, languages, and cultures, often ready to make war on one another for land, food, and resources. Today, the rise of the European Union and a shared sense of community and cultural identity have curbed the ceaseless wars and genocides of previous centuries, but not every European nation favors integration into the EU; and not all members have entirely given up dreams of increased size, wealth, and power.
During and after World War II, the Soviet Union established several satellite states along its border with the rest of Europe. The obvious purpose of these nations was to serve as a shield against possible military incursion from the rest of Europe, which was heavily pro-American after the war. The also served a subtler role in limiting cultural and ideological exchange with the rest of the Continent.
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was an archetypal example. It encompassed an area containing several culturally and ethnically diverse peoples; the new government, reconstituted from the pre-war Kingdom of Yugoslavia, sought to unite all of southeastern Europe’s Slavs under one banner (“Yugoslavia” means “Southern Slav Land”). The worker’s paradise promised by the Soviet Union never materialized, however, and the USSR had to spend considerable effort to keep the heterogeneous population at peace. As the Soviet Union slowly collapsed, the fragmentation of Yugoslavia seemed inevitable.
In December, 1990, referendum in Slovenia indicated the populace overwhelmingly favored the independence from Yugoslavia. Alarmed, the Yugoslavian government reacted with a new policy of mothballing the decentralized military reserve forces of its territories and integrating their men and equipment into the Yugoslavian People’s Army, which was loyal exclusively to Yugoslavia and not its principalities.
Aware that the Yugoslavian central government was trying to de-fang its constituents with a quiet pre-emptive strike, Slovenians resisted this campaign of regional disarmament. Slovenia had always maintained a distinct regional identity, and it quickly put in place an alternate command structure to subvert the authority of those loyal to the central government and ensure that only the least valuable materiel was turned over to the People’s Army. Slovenians knew that they could not defeat the Yugoslavian People’s Army in a prolonged struggle. For six months, they planned an unconventional rebellion.
Even the first military action of the war was calculated to capture and hold the initiative. After an announcement that it would formally declare independence on June 26, 1991, Slovenia instead did so on June 25-pre-empting People’s Army troops preparing for a counter-offensive the next day. Caught before it had finalized its strategies for the looming rebellion, the Yugoslavian People’s Army vacillated between pleas for unity and cooperation, and shows of force to intimidate Slovenians into obedience.
Before open warfare began, the Slovenians established contact with the world news services and successfully portrayed themselves as freedom-loving, pro-democracy underdogs; despite the traditional hostility between news agencies and soldiers, Slovenian troops were generally polite and solicitous, offering protection to reporters interested in observing the war at close quarters. Soon the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia found itself facing considerable pressure from the international community. This was one of the first wars in which a faction used the media as leverage on the battlefield, leading to what later pundits dubbed “the CNN effect.” The US would duplicate many of these tactics later with the “embedded journalists” of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
The Yugoslavian People’s Army found itself at a considerable disadvantage on the battlefield, as Slovenians used prepared ambush points, superior knowledge of the terrain, and shorter supply lines to execute rapid offensives. Worse, many military objectives were guarded by Slovenian loyalists, who could “seize” territory for Slovenia, quickly and bloodlessly, just by changing uniforms. The bewildered Yugoslavian People’s Army suffered relatively few casualties and few decisive losses, but they faced a high rate of surrender and desertion. Many were ethnic Slovenians themselves, or sympathetic to the cause; fewer had any real devotion to the Republic of Yugoslavia.
On July 2, after a day of several significant military successes, the Slovenian leaders declared a unilateral ceasefire. A day later, Yugoslavian troops accepted the ceasefire and began a withdrawal. Over the next few days, the Yugoslavian National Army abandoned its positions on Slovenian soil, leaving behind most of its material for the Slovenians. The war came to an official end on July 7, 1991, with a treaty heavily slanted in favor of Slovenia.
The show of weakness was ultimately fatal for Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Croatia rebelled at the same time as Slovenia, though their war for independence lasted years, not days. In 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina also seceded from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. That left only a tiny fraction of the former nation still calling itself the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (no longer socialist), and that too fractured in 2006.
After three generations, the old Yugoslavian government had fallen. Now almost a dozen bickering nations stand in its place; and they don’t get along well.